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BOOK REVIEW
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800; VOLUME IV: ORGANIZING THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LEGISLATION AND COMMENTARIES.
Edited by Maeva Marcus. New York, Columbia University Press, 1992.

Pp. 800. $95.00
Reviewed by William P. LaPiana*
The fourth volume of The Documentary History of the Supreme Court
of the United States, 1789-180X is subtitled Organizing the Federal
Judiciary.Legislation and Commentaries.1 The subtitle neatly summarizes
the contents. The first part of the work sets forth the legislation of the first
six Congresses concerning the federal judiciary, including some bills that
were never enacted. 2 Each section has an appropriate and helpful
introduction.' The work's second part consists of extracts from
periodicals and private correspondence that comment on the legislation.4
The chronological scope thus carries the reader from the Judiciary Act of
1789 to the ill-fated Judiciary Act of 1801,6 which gave John Adams the
opportunity to appoint the midnight judges7 and created the situation that
led to Marbury v. Madison.' Although the drama and intrigue of that case
is outside the scope of this volume, anyone interested in a full
understanding of the political passions that lay behind it will find the
current volume useful. 9
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
1789-1800 ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: LEGISLATION AND
COMMENTARIES (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
2. See 4 id. at 1-361.
3. See 4 id. at 19, 176, 212, 216, 223, 243.
4. See 4 id. at 362-722.
STATES,

5. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 38-108.
6. 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802); see 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1,

at 295-310.
7. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 294 (stating that passage
of the Judiciary Act of 1801 allowed President Adams to fill "all the new judicial
positions [created by the Act] in the few weeks before he left office").
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND
POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971) (analyzing the relationship between an

independent judiciary and the development of American democracy).
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Although both the legislative and commentary sections' organization
is chronological, the extensively detailed index is an excellent tool for
pursuing specific topics. ° Every section of each major piece of
legislation is given a separate entry, with a summary of its provisions and
page references to both legislative materials and commentaries. Entries for
individuals are carefully detailed allowing the researcher to find comments
on specific subjects as well as all letters to or from the individual included
in the commentary section.'"
Some of those subjects include highly controversial topics, such as:
the role of the common law in the federal courts; the very existence of a
common law of the United States; and the place of politics in the federal
judiciary. 2 The material does not provide any startling revelations; in
fact, on some subjects the editors take no position. For example, in the
much debated role-if any-of a federal common law, the editors
reproduce Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789's along with Oliver
Ellsworth's famous first draft referring to "the Stat ute [sic] law of the
several States in force for the time being, & their unwritten or common
law." 4 The introductory editorial note simply states that "when or why"
the change from the precise description "Statute law" to the simple term
"Laws" was made "is not known . . . nor can it be determined exactly
when or how this section came into being."'"
The editors did include, however, several documents, listed in the
index under the topic "Common Law," that give interesting insights into
the issue involved in Section 34.16 In August 1790, the House of
Representatives requested a report from Attorney General Edmund
Randolph on improving the administration of justice.' 7 Randolph
produced a c6mprehensive report and a draft for a new judiciary act. The
draft provided an explicit adoption of the common law as a rule of
decision "so far as the same be not altered by the supreme law, by the
laws of particular states, or by statutes. " " In his report, Randolph
10. See 4 TiH DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 751-800.
11. See, e.g., 4 id. at 774 (showing topics relating to John Jay, including various
letters, comments, orders, and positions).
12. See, e.g., 4 id. at 769 (referring to Oliver Ellsworth's comments on common
law); id. at 783 (referring to John Lowell's comment on proposed alterations to the
judicial system).

13. Ch. 34, 1 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see 4 THm
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supranote 1, at 105.

14. 4

THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supranote

1, at 105-06.

15. 4id.

16. 4 id. at 760.
17. 4 id. at 122.
18. Edmund Randolph, Report of the Attorney-General to the House of
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explained this provision, noting that "[i]t is conjectured that the common
law was omitted among the rules of decision, as having been already the
law of the United States." 19 That was, of course, a controversial
assertion, and Randolph was quite wrong when he added: "[m]ost
probably [the existence of a common law of the United States] will be
seldom if ever controverted."' More interesting, however, is his
rationale for making the adoption of the common law explicit. He believed
that without a statutory provision, the federal courts might use commonlaw doctrine either only to the extent that it was used in federal statutes
or, in diversity cases, the doctrine might be limited to a particular state's
common law. 2' Because some parts of the common law "do not fall
within either of these characters" those parts would "be estranged from
our system.""
Randolph's assertions and recommendations illustrate the ambiguity
of the word "Laws" as used in Section 34.' Such a view of the nature
of law made it possible to assert, as did Pennsylvania Judge Edward
Shippen in a letter to Robert Morris, that "it should not be left to the
Judges to make the Law, but only to declare it."' The common law,
however, is bigger than the laws of any one jurisdiction, and its doctrines
exist and should be "rules of decision" even if they have not been reduced
to the written formulae of statutes or specific decisions of a particular
jurisdiction.'
This brief discussion of one small topic covered in this volume
reminds us that in some ways legislators who initially defined the federal
judiciary thought differently from us. Indeed, the whole message of
history, especially for lawyers who are so committed to the idea of
precedent, is that the past can be very different from the present, and that
the same words can mean one thing in 1790 and a very different thing 200
Representatives, in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 128, 160.
19. Randolph, supra note 18, at 138.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., id. at 161, 166-67 (discussing the difference between law and fact in
the context of the Process Act of 1789).
24. Letter from Edward Shippen to Robert Morris (July 13, 1789), in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 464, 466 [hereinafter Shippen Letter].
25. See William P. LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the
Sky: An Investigation ofthe Idea ofLaw in Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
771, 779-80 (1986) (stating that the First Congress, in passing the Judiciary Act of 1789,
"tied the hands of the federal courts by requiring that the law of the several states be
regarded as the rules of decision").
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years later. 6 We have trouble accepting Randolph's 27 and Shippen's?
idea of the common law and Story's holding in Swift v. Tyson,29 which
faithfully reflects it, because nineteenth-century positivism has thoroughly
transformed legal culture.' ° This is exemplified by John Austin's ideas

about law, which in turn helped inspire modern American legal
education.31 Today, law is what the legislature and judges say it is, and,
in a simple way, we are all legal realists.
We all may be realists, but that does not keep many of us from

looking for some basis for law more consistent, and more dignified, than
the judge's breakfast menu or the legislative influence of special-interest
groups and the skill of their lobbyists. In recent years, the idea of
"original intent" has become one of the most popular of these more
permanent bases for the law.32 This volume puts one more nail in the
coffin of that idea-no one knows what Ellsworth meant when he altered

the wording of Section 34 of the 1789 Act 3 -and

on a much bigger

scale, the entire book shows over and over the importance of political
compromise in forming the federal judiciary.
"Politicks are very
26. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest For The Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204, 208-09 (1980) (suggesting that statements made "one or two hundred
years ago" may have a different meaning in today's society).
27. Randolph, supra note 18, at 138.
28. Shippen Letter, supra note 24, at 466.
29. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (interpreting the word "Laws" in Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 as not including decisions of state courts); see also LaPiana, supra
note 25, at 773 (stating that Justice Story held that "the word 'laws' in section 34 did not
include the decisions of state courts" as those decisions were, "at most, only evidence
of what the laws are, and ... not of themselves laws").
30. See generally LaPiana, supra note 25 (using Justice Story's opinion in Swift v.
Tyson as a basis for examination of American law in the 19th century).
31. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); see
also WILFRID E. RUMBLE, THE THOUoHT OF JOHN AUSTIN 2 (1985) (asserting that
"Austin's philosophy is ... important because of its pivotal role in the development of
legal positivism"); William P. LaPiana, Victorian From Beacon Hill: Oliver Wendell
Holmes's Early Legal Scholarship, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811 (1990) (describing
Austin as an "exemplar of [one of the] 'modem' approaches to law").
32. See James A. Gardner, The PositivistFoundationsof Originalism:An Account
and Critique, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (mentioning the attraction of originalism and its
continued application in the courts); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 17 (1990) (asserting that original
intent is the only appropriate method of statutory and constitutional initerpretation).
33. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 105.
34. See 4 id. at 3-18 (discussing the numerous areas of controversy surrounding
ratification of Article III of the Constitution).
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irritable matters,"" as Massachusetts Judge James Sullivan wrote to
Senator John Langdon. Nevertheless, politics shaped the judiciary and left

that shape open to criticism and attempts at revision.' One lesson of the

materials gathered here is the skill with which the Judiciary Adt of
180111 was drafted to meet serious shortcomings that the previous decade
had revealed." To some degree, everyone accepted the idea that the 1789
Act was an experiment that would have to be revisited sooner or
later 3 9-sooner, especially given Randolph's report of 1790.' The 1801
Act, however, was also shaped by the Federalists' desire to keep control
of the judiciary in the face of Jefferson's victory in 180041 and was
repealed by Republicans equally determined to frustrate the Federalists.42
The documentary bases of our system of government are all the products
of compromise, and it seems extraordinarily difficult to extract from their

words binding principles for a transformed world.43
Original intent, however, can signify several different approaches to
the record of the past. Although the exact words of our founding
documents are the product of political compromise, there may be ideas
and beliefs on which no compromise was necessary because they were so
widely accepted.' Perhaps we should look for guidance not to specific
words but to the political and legal culture of the founding period in the
hope of finding principles that will serve to inspire governance of our
world.
35. Letter from James Sullivan to John Langdon (Mar. 29, 1789), in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 372, 372.
36. See, e.g., Randolph, supranote 18, at 128 (criticizing and proposing revisions
to the Judiciary Act of 1789); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
37. 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
38. See, e.g., Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Mar. 22, 1789), in 4
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 372 (expressing dislike for the proposed
judicial plan); Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Apr. 22, 1789), in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 376 (describing the difficulty in forming a
consensus among the Congressional representatives of the States).
39. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 284.
40. See 4 id. at 35.
41. See 4 id. at 284-95 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the passageof the
Judiciary Act of 1801).
42. See 4 id. at 294-95.
43. See, e.g., 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 5-8 (describing the
controversy at the Constitutional convention concerning the creation of inferior federal
courts, the jurisdiction of those courts, and the resultant Article III provisions).
44. William E. Nelson, Reason and Compromise in the Establishmentofthe Federal
Constitution, 1787-1801, 44 WM. & MARY Q., 3d ser., 458-84 (1987).
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One such principle, revealed by the editors, could be described as

access to the law.' Much of the political struggle over the forming of the
federal judiciary involved geography: where would the courts sit?'
While it is easy to dismiss this controversy as a struggle over the
economic benefits of legal business,' a careful reading of the material

shows a deep and passionate concern for arranging a system that will
allow for easier physical access to the courts." It is fashionable today to
deprecate Americans' willingness to rely on the law.49 Our political
ancestors, however, knew that the greatest protection for their rights,

property, and person lay in the fair and convenient administration of the
law. 50

Today, geography is not much of a barrier to litigants, certainly not
the sort of barrier it was 200 years ago."' Other barriers abound,
however, whether they be economic or cultural. For example, if an
aggrieved citizen cannot afford to hire legal representation or if bigotry,
-45. See, e.g., 4 id. at xxi ("Congress conceived and fashioned a system of courts
that would 'bring justice to every man's door.'") (quoting "Brutus," Letter No. XIV, part
2, N.Y. J. & WKLY. REG., Mar. 6, 1789, reprinted in William Jeffrey, Jr., ed., The
Letters of "Brutus"-A Neglected Element in the Ratijfication Campaign of 1787-88, 40
U. CiN. L. REv.643, 765 (1971) [hereinafterLetter No. XIV]); William Patterson, Notes
for Remarks on Judiciary Bill, in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supranote 1, at 414,
416 (observing that federal circuit courts will "carry Law to their [the people's] Homes
[and] Courts to their Doors [and] meet every Citizen in his home State").
46. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 28-29 (describing the
debates over locations of the federal courts).
47. See 4 id. at 29 ("Since a town that was chosen as the site of the federal court
immediately gained prestige and business, there was intense competition for this
honor.").
48. See 4 id. at xxi ("The documents published in this volume .
reveal how
Congress conceived and fashioned a system of courts that would 'bring justice to every
man's door.'") (quoting Letter No. XIV, supra note 45, at 765).
49. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The
Council on Competitiveness Agenda For Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244 (1992)
(critiquing former Vice President Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, which perceived
that the prevalence of lawsuits has had a significant negative impact in the U.S.
economy). But see Gregory B. Butler & Brian D. Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns:
A Response to Dr. Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251 (1992) (discussing and supporting the
Council on Competitiveness and arguing that the civil justice system is in crisis).
50. See, e.g., 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supranote 1, at 15-16 (discussing
Alexander Hamilton's view that federal courts were "necessary to defend the people and
the Constitution from a grasping legislature").
51. See 4 id. at 14 (stating the concern of Pennsylvania Antifederalists that many
Americans would face difficulty "in traveling to a distant Supreme Court to plead their
cases").
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directed against a group to which the citizen happens to belong, blocks a
citizen's access to the law, a mockery is made of the promise of due
process.52 If we want inspiration for the American law of today, we
should look not to engrossed parchment but to the ideas and ideals of our
nation's founders to find what may still guide us in the modem world.
Volume Four of The Documentary History of the Supreme Court provides
much material for careful contemplation.

52. See Jane Rutherford, The Myth ofDue Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 99 (1992)
(concluding that due process will be viewed by some as nothing more than a myth "[slo
long as women, the poor, and minorities are excluded from meaningful participation and
power").

